/devil-mode — Adversarial Parallel Sweep

Four red-team specialists attack your codebase from every angle attackers actually use. What would take a security firm a week of billable hours, your repo gets in 20 minutes.

> Read the brief first. Each agent thinks like a hostile actor. Findings will be uncomfortable. That's the point.

What Gets Launched in Parallel

| Agent | Hunts | |---|---| | prompt-injection-hunter | Jailbreak vectors, indirect injection, system-prompt leaks, tool-call hijacking | | supply-chain-auditor | Typosquats, malicious post-install, lockfile drift, slopsquats, compromised deps | | secret-hunter | Live secrets, git history leaks, encoded creds, bundled-to-client env vars | | backdoor-hunter | Obfuscated payloads, network beacons, time bombs, eval/exec abuse, cryptominers |

Optional Extension Agents

Use these flags to add more agents to the sweep:

| Flag | Adds | |---|---| | --license | license-violation-finder (GPL contamination, attribution gaps) | | --theft | code-stealer-detector (copy-paste provenance, copyleft hits) | | --jailbreak | jailbreak-tester (live AI feature red-team) | | --chaos | chaos-engineer (fault-injection plan generation) | | --all | All 8 agents — the full devil sweep |

Usage

/devil-mode                  # 4-agent default sweep
/devil-mode --all            # all 8 adversarial agents
/devil-mode src/auth/        # focus on auth module
/devil-mode --pre-public     # before going open-source: --license + --theft + default
/devil-mode --pre-launch     # before public launch: --jailbreak + default + --chaos

Report Format

## DEVIL MODE REPORT
Prompt Injection Surface (prompt-injection-hunter)
CRITICAL: [list]
HIGH:     [list]
DEFENSE GAPS: [where existing protections can be bypassed]
Supply Chain (supply-chain-auditor)
THREATS:    [confirmed malicious / typosquat / drift]
WATCHLIST:  [suspicious patterns]
LOCKFILE:   [OK / drift / missing]
Leaked Secrets (secret-hunter)
ACTIVE:     [rotate now — still valid]
HISTORICAL: [git history leaks — assume compromised]
BUNDLED:    [exposed to every client visit]
Backdoors / Malicious Code (backdoor-hunter)
CRITICAL:   [confirmed reverse-shell / RCE / exfiltration]
SUSPICIOUS: [needs manual decode/review]

TOTAL EXPOSURE:    X critical, Y high, Z medium across N agents
PRIORITIZED ACTIONS:
  1. [first action — usually rotate or revert]
  2. [second]
  3. [third]

When to Use

• Before going open-source — any repo about to be public, run with --pre-public
• Before any public launch — run with --pre-launch
• After accepting code from new contractor / contributor — full audit with --all
• Quarterly red-team review — schedule it
• After any compromise alert / vendor security advisory — verify your exposure
• Before M&A due diligence — what their lawyers will find, you find first
• After major dep update — supply-chain + backdoor + secret sweep

When NOT to Use

• On code you don't have permission to audit (run only on your own repos / authorized targets)
• On production systems for chaos-engineer flag — chaos requires --staging or signed-off blast radius
• As a substitute for actual security review — this finds patterns; humans verify exploitability

Execute Now

Invoking this command is confirmation to proceed. Execute immediately:

• Parse $ARGUMENTS for scope path and flags (--all, --license, --theft, --jailbreak, --chaos, --pre-public, --pre-launch).
• Determine the agent set:

• Spawn all selected agents simultaneously with run_in_background: true.
• Wait for all to complete.
• Aggregate findings into the Devil Mode Report format above.
• Prioritize actions by severity (critical first), with concrete recommended fix for each.
• End with: "Which threat do you want to neutralize first?"

Severity Priority Order

When aggregating across agents, sort findings by:

• Active credential leak (still valid keys) — rotate immediately
• Confirmed backdoor / malicious code in current dep — quarantine + revert
• Confirmed prompt injection with tool-call abuse possible — disable affected agent
• Critical supply-chain threat (typosquat, malicious postinstall) — remove dep
• Historical credential leak in git history — rotate, plan history rewrite
• High-severity prompt injection without tool abuse — patch + monitor
• License/IP exposure — remediate before any public action
• Suspicious patterns needing manual review — schedule deep dive

Remember: The devil-mode report is uncomfortable on purpose. Every finding here is one an attacker can find too — the only question is whether you fix it first.